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Political Testament of Frederick II ("the Great") (1752)

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It may be well for a Prince, when uncertain, to consult the Minister whom he judges to be the wisest and the most experienced; if he wants to consult a second, this should be done separately so as to avoid sowing the seeds of an ineradicable jealousy by preferring the advice of one man to another’s. I shut up my secrets in my own mind; I keep only one secretary (of whose loyalty I am satisfied); without corrupting me personally, it is impossible to guess my designs. The Ministers here are charged only with Imperial [sic] affairs; all important negotiations, treaties, or alliances pass through my hands.


On Foreign Policy

[ . . . ]

[When he turns to foreign policy, Frederick points out that “by our geographical position, we are neighbors of the greatest Princes of Europe; all these neighbors alike are jealous of us and secret enemies of our power. The geographical situation of their countries, their ambitions, their interests, all these different combinations determine the principles of their policies, which are more or less hidden according to time and circumstance.”

Frederick then surveys the list of Prussia’s enemies: Austria– by far the most ambitious, and also “of all the European Powers the one which we have offended most deeply, which will never forget either the loss of Silesia or that part of her authority which we divide with her in Germany”; England, via Hanover; Russia–only “an accidental enemy” through the personal policy of her chancellor, Bestuzhev (if he could be gotten rid of, “things would revert to their natural condition”); Saxony –“a vessel without a compass; the Netherlands–“without sufficient discernment to know whom they should love and whom hate.” Against these, Prussia’s natural allies are headed by France, but Frederick includes among them also some other minor powers, principally those which feel themselves threatened by Austria. He goes on:]

In view of the present situation, you can easily see that Prussia will never lack for allies. To choose them, one must divest oneself of any personal hatred and of any prejudice, favorable or unfavorable. The interest of the State is the only consideration that should decide the counsel of a Prince. Our present interest, especially since the acquisition of Silesia, is to remain united with France, as with all the enemies of Austria. Silesia and Lorraine are two sisters, of whom Prussia has married the elder and France the younger. This alliance forces them to follow the same policy. Prussia could not watch unmoved while Alsace and Lorraine were taken from France, and Prussia’s diversions in favor of France are efficacious, because they carry the war immediately into the heart of the Hereditary Provinces [of Austria]. France, for similar reasons, cannot suffer Austria to recover Silesia, because that would weaken too greatly an ally of France, which is useful to her for the affairs of the North and of the Empire and whose diversions (as I have just said) provide certain safety for Lorraine and Alsace, in case of acute and unforeseen danger. [ . . . ]

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