However you must not hold the government – nor the governments of any of the twenty-two confederated states – under the suspicion of wishing to renounce the historical, constitutional development of Germany. You must not accuse them of perhaps wishing to use this Parliament to wear down parliamentarianism in a struggle of Parliaments against each other. What would we gain from that? Is then, in the long run, a government conceivable that sets for itself the task of forging a union in fire or even with cold metal, should the fire cool down – a union that is not viewed with favor everywhere in Europe – and, then, so-to-speak, sets for itself the systematic task of suppressing the rights of the population to participate in its own affairs, enters into a savage policy of reaction, wastes time in struggles with its own people? Gentlemen, you cannot believe it likely that a dynasty such as the one that rules over Prussia, that any of the dynasties that at present rule in Germany, would approach a national undertaking with such – I cannot call it anything else – hypocrisy.
(Spirited bravo!)
We desire the development of freedom to the greatest degree compatible with the security of the whole. The issue can only be that of the limits. How much and what is in the long run compatible with this security? What is at present compatible with it? Is a transition stage necessary? How long must it last?
(Very good! Bravo!)
It cannot be our intention to withdraw the military budget from your cognizance even for the, in my opinion, indispensable period of time in which it should be treated by yourselves as immutable. One has spoken here as if the military budget hereafter is to be treated with a certain secrecy. Insofar as I have made up my mind on this matter at all, I envision that we would in any case present a budget that includes the total expenditures of the Confederation, military expenditures not excluded. Only we would do that on the basis of an agreement, to be reached with the representatives of the people, that would last for a certain number of years and would ensure that one could strike nothing from the military budget for this period, at least nothing that had not been agreed upon with the commander in chief of the Confederation. It is indeed possible that the commander in chief could convince himself that he cannot do without this or that, that he could say: “I want that.” But there must be a period of time in which the existence of the army of the Confederation does not depend upon the fortuitous oscillations of the majority. I gladly admit that it is highly improbable that in this Reichstag a majority would be found that would not approve what in its opinion was sufficient for the defense of the country. In this connection I am not especially fearful of the particularists in the manner referred to here. I fear much more the jumbling of the boundary between parliamentary and princely power with respect to Germany's ability to defend itself against foreign enemies. I do not think it desirable that one has the urge to exercise the kind of parliamentary influence that is being sought – and that we gladly grant to the Parliaments – chiefly on the army, while numerous other fields in which it could be exercised remain continually untouched. I believe, gentlemen, that it would be a more effective means to secure for yourself influence over the governments (which several speakers on the day before yesterday regretted not seeing), if, for example, you drew customs treaties under the sway of your legislation in such a way as to cut the realm off from its resources; if, for example, you did away with those officials who were included in the budget for the collection of customs duties; if, when you wanted to turn your activity toward setting aside a system of government that was unacceptable to you, you chose to cripple the railroad and telegraph systems. Gentlemen, I believe that these things would perhaps be more effective than reserving for yourselves the right to determine the composition and size of the army, for in the latter case the decision concerns the foundations of security and of the existence of the state, particularly in a federal state. There the government would be in the same position of finding it impossible to give in as the one in which the Prussian government has believed itself to be for several years now. Gentlemen, if this institution, the army of the Confederation, for the time being the most developed of the bases of a united Germany, the foundation that is the most indispensable to us, were to be placed in question through an annual vote, it would for me create the impression – forgive me. I use an analogy drawn from a profession that I at one time found myself in – of a dike association in which each year it was decided according to a head count, one that also included the propertyless, whether in case of high water the dikes should be broken or not. I would simply resign from such a dike association, for living would be too insecure for me, and I would not surrender myself to the danger that at some time those who wish to operate with open pastures would win the upper hand from those who work with tilled and water-free fields and that all would be ruined by a flood.
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