Mr. Bernstein reported as follows:
(1) The agreement which Mr. Rublee took away with him is the best that the Nazis can be expected to offer.
(2) The Nazis will live up to whatever they promised.
(3) American Jewry ought to cooperate fully with the plan, no matter how distasteful some of its terms may be.
(4) Germany has learned to respect America, it is time for Ambassador Wilson to come back to his post, and American Jewry ought to do nothing to prevent this development.
What I said was as follows:
(1) The agreement which Mr. Rublee took away with him was undoubtedly the best that anybody could obtain from the Germans and represented the limit of cooperation (if one might even call it cooperation) which the radicals would agree to. Göring made these concessions, but I have reason to know that the Secret Police were not in favor of going so far.
(2) I did not say that the Nazis would live up to whatever they promised. That is a general statement which nobody knowing the German situation could possibly make. I said to Mr. Bernstein that I was very sure that they would carry out the general scheme of the plan, providing that the Intergovernmental Committee were able to arrange for the emigration of substantial numbers of people. I said that the general arrangement of the plan would be carried out because I personally knew that both Göring and Hitler were agreeable to the scheme and therefore such persons as Himmler, Streicher and Goebbels would not dare to go back on it; that there would undoubtedly be chiseling and that the refugees would be victimized, but that they would certainly carry out those parts of the plan that were to their advantage.
(3) I do not remember having said that American Jewry ought to cooperate fully with the plan, no matter how distasteful some of its terms might be. The purpose of my speaking to Bernstein was of course to get him to use his influence in the United States to see that the plan, if the details should be published, should not be rejected, as in that case I saw only chaos.
(4) With regard to the fourth point - as you know, I have held the view that in times of crisis and great stress it is advisable to be as well represented abroad as possible, and at the time of the conversation I thought that it would be generally in the interest of all concerned to have Ambassador Wilson return. I was particularly anxious to impress upon Mr. Bernstein the inadvisability of leading members of the Jewish community in America doing anything to prevent the return of the Ambassador, as the National Socialist leaders were inclined to blame the Jews for the Ambassador's retention in America. I thought that Mr. Bernstein was in a position to present an interpretation of the situation which might be most advantageous and helpful for all concerned.
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