Lengthy marches outside the theater of war are normally made under easier conditions, and daily casualties are fewer. On the other hand, the slightest sickness usually keeps a man away from his unit for a long time: it is difficult for the convalescent to catch up with the advancing army.
In the case of cavalry there is a steady increase in lame and sore-backed horses; vehicles tend to break down, and confusion results. A march of 500 miles or more will always cause an army to arrive at its destination in a highly weakened condition, especially where horses and wagons are concerned.
If a march of that sort must be made within the theater of war under the enemy's eyes, the disadvantages add up. Where substantial numbers are involved and the general conditions are adverse, losses can mount to unbelievable proportions.
Let us give a few examples to illustrate our point.
When Bonaparte crossed the Niemen on 24 June 1812, his enormous center, which he subsequently led to Moscow, numbered 301,000 men. At Smolensk on 15 August he detached 13,500 men, so 287,500 men should have been left. The actual strength of his army, however, was only 182,000 men—which means that 105,500 had been lost*. Bearing in mind that only two engagements worth the name had so far taken place—one between Davout and Bagration and the other between Murat and Tolstoy-Ostermann—the French battle casualties may have been 10,000 men at most. The losses due to sickness and stragglers for this period of 52 days and an advance of about 350 miles would thus number 95,000 men, or about one third of the whole army.
Three weeks later, at the battle of Borodino, losses (including those in action) had reached 144,000 men, and at Moscow, a week later, they came to 198,000 men. Overall, in the first of the above periods, the army's daily rate of loss was 1 in 150 of the original total strength; in the second period 1 in 120; and in the third, 1 in 19.
* All these figures are taken from Chambray (original footnote).
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