Since the invention of cannon, and as cannon have been improved and reduced in weight, their number has naturally increased. Even so, since the time of Frederick the Great, the proportionate strength of artillery has remained fairly constant: two or three guns per thousand men—that is at the outset of a campaign. In the course of operations guns are not lost as fast as men, and so their proportion is a good deal higher by the end; possibly arriving at a ratio of three, four or five guns per thousand men. Only experience will determine whether these are the normal proportions, or whether guns can go on being increased without encumbering the whole conduct of war.
Let us now summarize the conclusions to which these arguments have led:
1. Infantry is the main branch of the service; the other two are supplementary.
2. A high degree of skill and vigor in the conduct of war can to some extent make up for a lack of the supplementary branches—assuming great numerical superiority in infantry. The higher the quality of the infantry, the easier this will be.
3. It is harder to do without artillery than without cavalry: artillery is the principal agent of destruction, and its use in action is more closely coordinated with the infantry's.
4. In general, artillery being the strongest agent of destruction and cavalry the weakest, one is always confronted with the question of how much artillery one can have without it being a disadvantage, and with how little cavalry one can manage.
[ . . . ]
(Book Five) Chapter Eleven: Marches—Continued
Experience is the best guideline for the length of a march and the time it will require.
Modern armies have long been accustomed to consider a fifteen-mile march as a day's work. In extensive operations it must be reduced to an average of the miles in order to allow for the requisite days of rest on which necessary repairs and maintenance can be carried out.
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