2. For this reason I regard Soviet diplomacy not only as unreliable but as not comparable with the diplomatic leadership of other nations and, therefore, as ineligible to undertake negotiations and sign treaties. 'Treaties' can only be signed with combatants who are on the same ideological plane.
3. However, were we—which God forbid—to be saved by Soviet aid on some occasion, this would clearly imply the planting of the red flag in Germany.
4. In so far as the growth in Russia's military strength reduces the value to France of her Polish ally to the extent that French intentions towards Germany in the East are seriously jeopardized, France will either endeavor to draw Russia away from Poland or, in the event of the failure of such an action, drop Poland and replace her with Russia.
5. Germany's political cooperation with Russia produces an adverse response from the rest of the world. Economic cooperation will destroy our German export industry in the future.
It is for these reasons that for the past twelve years or so I have consistently proposed a closer relationship with Italy on the one hand and England on the other as the most desirable diplomatic goal.
[ . . . ]
Following the noticeable reduction in the value of her Polish ally, France has endeavored—and in my view successfully—to involve Russia in the Far East in order to relieve pressure on the Polish border. This far-reaching French action may be regarded as in essence successfully accomplished in the non-aggression pact between Russia and Poland which has now been signed. [ . . . ]
The moment that a particular domestic political situation creates an international atmosphere hostile to Germany, Poland will seize the opportunity to attack and East Prussia will be lost. The declaration of a monarchy, for example, or any plan to restore the House of Hohenzollern—in whatever form—may immediately provoke this response.
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