Cartel is not able to govern, because the “anti-Cartel” is not able to govern. [In Britain] the Whigs are only capable of governing because once they have come to the end of the road; the Tories are right there to replace them. If that were not the case, some other authority would have to fill the gap, and it, too, would have to have existed before, and therefore also at least have shared power with the Whigs. We have this third authority: the monarchy, supported by the civil service and the army. What short-sighted, ordinary politicians are in the habit of calling the “fragmentation” [Zerfahrenheit] of our party landscape is nothing other than an expression of variety and health. How impoverished is a country whose political vitality is eventually represented by no more than two ideas! The wealth of parties in Germany equates to the wealth of our political life, and within this wealth the monarchy constitutes the element of unity. The unassailability of the monarchy's position is founded on the fact that no single party could ever dream of obtaining a majority in the Reichstag on its own. That is simply a given, based on Germany's nature and history. To have shaped from this circumstance an organic political system is Prince Bismarck's achievement. Hardly any party is absolutely opposed to the government; none can boast about being wholly identified with it either.
These reflections are all based on arguments we have already outlined in our previous two articles, published both before and after the elections. Whatever point of view one adopts, these considerations always culminate in the sentence: The traditional party divisions are obsolete; partly for practical reasons, partly even for principled ones, those divisions have been overcome, and any that remain are relegated to the background. The new tasks, however, which only seemed to be taking shape not long ago, have become urgent surprisingly quickly. Just as a new chapter in social legislation, which we believed to be far off in late January, was suddenly opened by the February decrees, the reorganization of our party life, which only seemed to be dawning on the horizon, will be unquestionably accelerated by the change in chancellors. Politics is conducted by people; consequently, every political rearrangement is facilitated if the traditional forces are represented by new faces. That is a law as old as parties and political life themselves. If it now happens that after the election outcome the government must make an attempt to pave the way for a modus vivendi with the German Radical Party, this will certainly be much easier for Chancellor [Leo] von Caprivi than for his predecessor. Prince Bismarck battled his way through the constitutional conflict against the liberals and yet created the Reich constitution with these same liberals. He battled his way through the Kulturkampf against the Center Party and yet created the system of protective tariffs and the foundations for social reform with this same Center Party. He would even have been able, if it were at all possible and if he had so wished, to engage the free trade party in useful cooperation as well. This is not to claim that his inventive mind could not have discovered any other options, or that there were necessarily signs that he wanted to take this course. His successor, however, is virtually compelled to follow this path. Just as with the Center Party, the reconciliation will hardly be fundamental, sudden, or complete. The German Radical Party will continue in opposition. With regard to practical questions, on the other hand, that party's members, or some of them, will be open to negotiation, and in the process the spiteful personal discord might gradually grow much quieter, though without being silenced altogether.
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