7) The temporary easing can only be brought about within the framework of our present economy. In this connexion, the following is to be noted:
a) Since the German people will be increasingly dependent on imports for their food and must likewise, whatever happens, import a proportion at least of certain raw materials from abroad, all means must be employed to make these imports possible.
b) An increase in our own exports is theoretically possible, but in practice hardly likely. Germany does not export to a political or economic vacuum but to areas for which competition is unprecedentedly severe. Our exports, compared with the general international economic decline, have sunk not only not more but in fact less than those of other peoples and States. But since imports of food have, on the whole, hardly dropped at all, but if anything are rising, an adjustment must be found in some other way.
c) It is, however, impossible to use foreign exchange allocated for raw materials to import foodstuffs without inflicting a heavy and perhaps even fatal blow on the rest of the German economy. But above all it is utterly impossible to do this at the expense of national rearmament. I must at this point most sharply reject the view that, by restricting national rearmament, i.e., the manufacture of arms and ammunition, we could bring about an “enrichment” in raw materials which might then benefit Germany in the event of war. Such a view is based on a complete misconception – not to use a harsher expression – of the tasks and military requirements with which we are faced. For even a successful saving of raw materials by reducing, for instance, the production of munitions would merely mean that we should stockpile these raw materials in time of peace so as to manufacture them only in the event of war; that is to say, we should be depriving ourselves, during the most critical months, of munitions, in exchange for raw copper, lead or possibly iron. But in such a case it would nonetheless be better for the nation to enter the war without one kilogram of stocks of copper but with full munitions depots, rather than with empty depots but so-called “enriched” stocks of raw materials.
War makes possible the mobilization of even the last supplies of metal. For it then becomes not an economic problem, but solely a question of will. And the National Socialist State leadership would possess the will, and also the resolution and the toughness, to solve these problems in the event of war. But it is much more important to prepare for war in time of peace! In addition, however, the following must be stated:
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