Constitutional Reservations against Maastricht Dismissed (November 3, 1993)

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b) On the Economic and Monetary Union

The court also supports the position of the Federal Government with respect to the economic and monetary union and confirmed that the monetary union “is conceived as a stability community whose primary task is to guarantee price stability.” This includes the following aspects:

The court agreed that the convergence criteria that decide on membership at the third stage cannot be “watered down.” The court emphasized that the latitude afforded by the treaty can only mean that it “must be possible to rule out by majority any remaining margins in estimations, assessments, and predictions.” This, however, does not make it permissible to abandon the convergence criteria.

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The court came to the overall conclusion that in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, Germany is not subjecting itself to an “unmanageable, uncontrollable ‘automatism’ on a self-guided path toward a monetary union; the treaty paves the way for a further step-by-step integration of the European Legal Community, which is dependent at every step on either prerequisites that can be presently anticipated by the parliament or additional Federal Government approval, which can be influenced through the parliament.”

The Federal Government ensured parliamentary participation prior to its entering into the third stage through the consent given by the Federal Minister of Finance to the German Bundestag on April 2, 1993, and its announcement to the Council, Commission, and European Parliament.

3. Implications for the Federal Government

The fundamental considerations of the BVerfG are conducive to the further development of the Union and keep prospects for enlarging and intensifying the Union open:

– The BVerfG has confirmed that there is room in the Basic Law for European integration. This includes the realization that our ability to use the rules of our constitution as a standard for the enlargement of the Union is limited. This also holds true for the democracy principle of the Basic Law, as long as the legitimation and influence that emanates from the people is ensured within the Union.

– The addition of Art. 23 (new) of the Basic Law (structural protection clause, participation of the Bundestag) has proven helpful in the constitutional validation of the Maastricht Treaty.

– It was affirmed that it is necessary to strengthen the role of the European Parliament to provide democratic support for the policies of the Community and to make the decisions of the Community more transparent as it is enlarged step-by-step.

– The Federal Government must ensure that the authorization standards of Community law will be respected and that the principle of subsidiarity will be taken into consideration in each case.