Despite the fact that, on my orders, a declaration to the effect that Germany had not mobilized a single soldier was conveyed twice to president Beneš, and despite the fact that the same assurances were given to the representatives of foreign powers, the fiction was maintained and disseminated that Czechoslovakia had been forced to mobilize by a German mobilization, and that Germany therefore had to rescind its own mobilization and renounce its intentions.
Dr. Beneš disseminated the story that the German Reich had been put into its proper place by his own decisive actions.
Now, since Germany had neither mobilized nor had any intention of attacking Czechoslovakia, the situation inevitably had to lead to a heavy loss of prestige for the Reich. Because of this intolerable provocation, which was exacerbated by the truly infamous persecution and terrorization of Germans living there, I decided to resolve the Sudeten German question once and for all – and radically at that. On May 28, I:
1. gave the orders to prepare military intervention against this state on October 2;
2. ordered the massive and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the west.
To prepare for the conflict with Mr. Beneš and to protect the Reich against other attempts at the exertion of influence, or even threats, the plan initially called for the immediate mobilization of 96 divisions, which could be followed in short order by a larger number of additional units.
[ . . . ]
If certain newspapers and politicians in the rest of the world now allege that Germany thus threatened other nations with military blackmail, this can only be based on a crude distortion of the facts. In a region where neither the British nor any other western nation has any business, Germany restored the right of self-determination to ten million German compatriots. It threatened no one in doing so; it merely fought back against attempted meddling by third parties.