[ . . . ]
On 3 January 1934, I was appointed Commander-in-Chief with effect from 1 February against the Führer's wishes, against Blomberg's wishes, but under the strongest pressure from Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.
I found a heap of ruins, in particular a severe crisis of confidence within the High Command.
Reichenau's and the Party's struggle against me began on the day of my appointment in so far as it had not already begun.
Reichenau's opposition is understandable, for he wanted to take over command of the Army and still does.
The Party sees in me not only the man who opposed the ambitions of the SA but also the man who tried to block the influx of party-political maxims into the Army.
Apart from the fact that the basis of our present Army is National Socialist and must be so, the infiltration of party-political influences into the Army cannot be tolerated since such influences can lead only to fragmentation and dissolution.
The task given me by the Führer when I reported to him on 1 February 1934 was: 'Create an army as strong and united as possible and with the best conceivable training'. I have followed these instructions ever since.
Reichenau's machinations meant that my relationship with Blomberg was continually troubled. Throughout these years I have never succeeded in establishing a relationship with Blomberg based on trust as should have been the case. [ . . . ]