But aren't we, the constantly complaining German electorate, part of the problem? Haven't we created the state we're now bemoaning: two large national parties, whose basic platforms differ so little that it's ultimately hard to say why we should vote at all? And if a politician did show up willing to tell us the truth, wouldn't we just send him packing?
In the months prior to the election, the voters grew so disappointed with the Schroder regime that re-election seemed almost out of the question. Two events turned the trend around: the summer deluge and the looming threat of war against Iraq.
The floods demonstrated that Mr. Schroder is able to respond quickly and unbureaucratically to an exceptional situation. In a moment of crisis, he enlarged himself.
No sooner had the floodwaters receded than the Bush administration appeared with its declaration against Iraq and became Mr. Schroder's unwitting supporter. There's no doubt that the chancellor's clear refusal to commit German troops to a unilateral American attack on Iraq dramatically helped his re-election. Since this probably hurt his standing with the U.S. to the same degree, I think the matter bears closer scrutiny.
Concerns about new or even old German anti-Americanism are really out of the question: it's enough to recall that on Sept. 11, 2001, a quarter of a million Berliners gathered at the Brandenburg Gate in a show of solidarity with the victims of the terrorist attacks. In the following days and weeks, the Schroder government translated this symbolic gesture into action. Germany has deployed 10,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. What's more, hundreds of German special forces took part in Operation Anaconda, fighting in the caves of Afghanistan alongside their British and American counterparts – though this is seldom reported in the American press.
If an American administration decides, without informing its European allies, that a second war is called for in order to unseat Saddam Hussein, then it should be prepared for international debate and even disagreement – unless it expects nothing less than blind obedience.
Mr. Schroder's refusal to commit German troops even if the United Nations calls for military intervention in Iraq is a different matter. With all understanding for the exigencies of running a campaign, it's clear that Mr. Schroder went too far with his evocation of a "German way." But isn't this declaration just as one-sided as Mr. Bush's pronounced willingness to stage a war against Iraq even without a United Nations mandate?
As far as the German elections are concerned, though, Mr. Schroder's unilateral approach to American unilateralism worked quite well: it was probably what won over just enough of the unconditional pacifists from the Green Party to prevent the Party of Democratic Socialism – the former Communist Party of East Germany – from obtaining the 5 percent necessary for representation in Parliament. Evidently Mr. Schroder has learned from American campaigns that only a candidate who has mastered all the tricks is ultimately worthy of becoming president or chancellor. I have no doubt that the successful sinner, Mr. Schroder, will quickly pick up the foreign policy pieces he shattered during the campaign.
But the rewards of his foreign policy independence will be short-lived unless he becomes a different chancellor – one who is prepared to cut the tangle of threads keeping the German Gulliver on its back.
Peter Schneider is the author, most recently, of "Eduard's Homecoming." His article was translated from German by Philip Boehm.
Source: Peter Schneider, “Schröder’s Little Win,” From The New York Times, © September 25, 2002 The New York Times. All rights reserved. Used by permission and protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States. The printing, copying, redistribution, or retransmission of the Material without express written permission is prohibited. www.nytimes.com.
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