Q: Do you believe that Cheney speaks for President Bush?
A: I am not qualified to say. The problem is that he has or seems to have committed himself so strongly that it is hard to imagine how he can climb down. And that is the real problem, that not only I have, but that all of us in Europe have. I think that a mistake has been made. It may be understandable in terms of domestic politics, but it has, of course, made things much more difficult for all those who were in agreement with the original objective of exerting pressure to have the inspectors admitted to the country.
After Sept. 11, the situation was quite different. We were among those whose military participation was likely to be requested, and we were all agreed there would be military action. And in that situation, where there is a need for secrecy, for the element of surprise, it is enough to be notified of the start of the operation just ahead of CNN or The New York Times.
The essential point is that everyone agrees on the question of whether something is going to happen. If we agree about that, we can then form different opinions, so to speak, about questions of when and how. That is the vital difference from Sept. 11. It was because I was inwardly convinced and had also been consulted that I said at the time: This thing has to be done, and I am going to force it through even if I have to call a vote of confidence, for the situation was not easy in Germany, especially with that coalition.
And that is why it is just not good enough if I learn from the American press about a speech which clearly states: We are going to do it, no matter what the world or our allies think. That is no way to treat others.
But there is another question that must be answered. According to my information, no one has a really clear idea of the political order that would follow in the Middle East. And such an idea is needed. No one has a clear idea about what the effects would be in the moderate Arab countries or what new political order might emerge after a military intervention in Iraq.
What I find particularly worrying, incidentally, is that there is so little discussion of the economic consequences for the world economy. [ . . . ]
There is another point I consider important. Germany is at present, after the United States, the second-largest provider of troops for international missions. We have almost 10,000 soldiers in the Balkans, involved in Enduring Freedom, and in Afghanistan. In 1998 we spent 170 million euros on international missions. This year it will be around 2 billion euros. I only mention this to make clear that no one can criticize us for lacking international solidarity. That is the one thing.
The other thing is that I was in Kabul and took a very close look at the situation. Germany is contributing a great deal to the international security force, perhaps more than any other country. I don’t want to be unjust to the others, but I think this estimate is not far out. My concern is that we have not even begun to achieve in Afghanistan anything that could be called nation-building. Yet if that is not succeeding before the eyes of the whole world, what advantage are the masses in the third world going to see in the restoration of a country to the civilized world?
What I mean to say is, we have to prove that a return to the civilized community of nations brings a prosperity dividend. And many people are watching what is happening in Afghanistan. We are deeply committed there, and that is why I say: Before we have made any progress there, before we have proved to the disenfranchised masses in the third world that it is worth their while to return to the Western fold, to the civilized world, I would say that military interventions — in whatever terms they may be justified — tend to be counterproductive for the international coalition against terror.
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