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The Schröder Era: Progress in Domestic Policy but Foreign Policy Doubts (November 17, 2005)

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Schröder’s Policies on Europe [Europapolitik] are among the Weakest

In the area of European politics, Schröder is among the weakest of all who have worked on the project of European integration since [Robert] Schumann and [Konrad] Adenauer. During his term, the accession of ten new EU member states was carried out, but the institutional and financial prerequisites that would allow the EU to function properly are still lacking.

Financial reform failed as did the constitutional treaty, to say nothing of the unspeakable agricultural policies. In particular, however, the capacity of the European Union to absorb new members was called into question, in principle, by Schröder’s resolutely envisaged goal of Turkish membership. For one thing, ten or fifteen years after the Eastern expansion, the EU can accept a major country in Asia Minor with 90 million Muslims only by risking internal collapse. Furthermore, and more importantly, the EU should finally acknowledge Europe’s historical boundaries and consequently not accept some non-European states such as Turkey, Ukraine, or Morocco as full members, but instead find another way to treat them as carefully as possible. The constitutional treaty failed in some countries [i.e. France and the Netherlands] on account of resistance to this overburdening of all European resources or, to put it more trenchantly, because it represents a betrayal of the genuine European project and of European identity. In some other countries, public opinion polls have shown that a stable two-thirds majority opposes this enlargement.


Turkey in the European Union? A Case of Wilhelmine Megalomania

In order to justify red-green policies on Turkey in the face of such opposition, Schröder invented – verbosely supported by Foreign Minister [Joschka] Fischer and EU Commissioner for Enlargement [Günter] Verheugen – a new kind of EU “finality” that is legitimized by no domestic German discussion and no agreement in Brussels. Up to now, this goal consisted of speaking out for economic and legal unity, and in the long term also for joint European political actions. But now with the accession of Turkey, the EU is allegedly supposed to rise to become a world power with a base from the North Cap to Kurdistan. This was a classical case of Wilhelmine megalomania, and its vocabulary was everywhere reminiscent of the squadrons of 1914. This goal appeared in similar form in [Germany’s] aspirations to gain a permanent ejection seat on the UN Security Council. This quest was doomed to fail from the outset on account of the international power configuration, and elementary political reason should have prevented its pursuit to begin with.

As the contemporary historian will conclude in 2009, after tormenting discussions, the EU talks with Turkey did not lead to the goal of a “world power of a new type.” In view of its re-Islamization, Turkey could not and did not wish to become more European as quickly as expected, and instead the Kemalist elites asserted themselves anew with their call for autonomy. In this respect, Schröder’s most spectacular move in Europe ended with the defeat of excessive expansionist policies. After wasted time, the slogan is now: Farewell to a world power of a new type, and onward with the integration of Europe. If we draw up a balance sheet of domestic and foreign policy achievements, it is impossible to identify a successful “Schröder Era” that is worthy of the name. What remains is his significant role as an impetus for the start of domestic reforms.

Hans-Ulrich Wehler is one of the most renowned German historians. From 1971 to 1996, he was Professor of Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History in Bielefeld.



Source: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Was bleibt von Schröder?” [“What Remains of Schröder?”], Die Zeit, November 17, 2005.

Translation: Allison Brown

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