Helmuth von Moltke: Memorandum on the Effect of Improvements in Firearms on Battlefield Tactics (1861)

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The smaller the prospect of success for frontal attack, the more probable are flanking maneuvers. Now as ever, villages, forest plots, etc. create desirable flank protection, yet in the absence of such local features even this can be replaced by a strongly rifled battery. The intensity and range of its fire compel the adversary to move so far to the flank that it is hardly possible for our countermeasures to be taken by surprise.

We counter the probability of enemy flanking maneuvers with the strength of our reserves and the depth of their position.

Given the effectiveness of our fire, we only need to occupy the front lightly and can keep the major portion of our forces in reserve. The range of the enemy artillery also assigns the reserves a position far to the rear, from which it is even easier to take on a new front.

[ . . . ]

It should now have been demonstrated that there is a positive advantage for us if we act defensively in a tactical position, which the enemy will be forced to attack for strategic reasons.

But he will not always be forced to do this, and his extended flanking maneuvers can only be countered by our offensive. Moreover, the advantage of the defense ceases as soon as there is no open terrain facing our front.

If the previous remarks are correct, it follows that we will absolutely avoid an attack wherever the enemy is in a position that secures him the advantages of an open front. A mass advance across the open plain, as occurs on our maneuver [exercise] fields, is useful for practice in regulation movements and in the operation of troops, but it can hardly be performed as an attack against an enemy who is under cover.

If we find the adversary in the kind of position that allows his firearms their full impact while restricting ours, we will have to avoid attacking there. Strategic movements, i.e. marching outside the range of enemy fire, will transfer the tactical decision to another field of battle, and even retreat will postpone it [the tactical decision] for this purpose.