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The Present Status of Denazification (December 31, 1950)

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In the operation of the law certain shortcomings have, it is true, become evident. It is generally conceded today, for instance, that it would have been wiser to have applied the penal aspects of the program more promptly and effectively to the real activists, while treating the great mass of lesser Nazis more leniently. As a matter of fact, it was soon recognized that the scope of the trials was too broad. The natural desire of the Germans was to raise the stigma from the innocent and the nominal ex-Nazis as soon as possible. This necessarily delayed the trials of the more serious offenders while, at the same time, the courts became bogged down in a mass of inconsequential cases. Realizing this, efforts were made to speed up the processing of the lesser cases. The amnesties extended in 1946 helped. A ‘schnell’ (fast) process, adopted in 1948 to dispose of the many cases of persons classified as followers, allowed the prosecutor to determine on the basis of written evidence whether or not the defendant actually was a follower, and if so to assess a fine and notify the accused without a public trial. If the accused was not satisfied he could appeal the decision. This allowed many of the minor cases to be disposed of rapidly, with the aim of devoting more attention to the involved and difficult cases of the major offenders. Despite these measures, the trial of many major Nazis was so long delayed that they benefited from the inevitable change of feeling among the people. It is literally true that by the time many of the more serious cases came up for trial the Germans were too tired of the whole business to care very much whether or not they received their due.

Another point on which critics often dwell is the alleged tendency of the denazification tribunals to exonerate ‘big Nazis’ while imposing severe penalties or disqualifications on some minor offenders. There were no doubt some instances of such discrimination. Yet this criticism represents only part of the truth.

The ‘big Nazi’ referred to was sometimes a man of influence, possibly a devoted Nazi, who made large contributions to the party and urged his employees to join. But he may have been a benevolent employer, and one who never persecuted anyone. So when he came before his peers and neighbors who sat on the courts, these people had no grievance against him. They did not judge him by his ideological beliefs but on his day-to-day activities which, from their point of view, were all in his favor. On the other hand the ‘little Nazi’, who may have been a cobbler, a postman, or a petty foreman, and who received severe sanctions and is often cited by the critics, may have been a fanatical Nazi. He may have denounced his neighbors to the Gestapo, belonged to the ‘hoodlums’ of the community, caused the arrest of his neighbors, their internment in concentration camps, or damage to their property. When such a ‘little Nazi’ came before the tribunal composed of his neighbors he was assessed a heavier penalty. It was too much to expect these farmers, artisans and work-a-day people to reason that had it not been for the benevolent ‘big Nazi’ with his big contributions to the party, hoodlums and Gestapo could not have prospered.

Criticism of the law today, however, is based on knowledge after the event. And in any case, this disadvantage of the law, if such it was, must be set off against the benefits derived from its having forced the local people, all over the Zone, to review actively what had taken place during the Nazi period.

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