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The Schlieffen Plan (1905)

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It can be assumed that the Germans’ advance will not be impeded. The disembarkation point for the reserve corps in the extreme left flank is on and behind the Saar above Saarbrucken, and in a worst-case scenario, it might prove necessary to shift this back. The advance of the entire army left of the Mosel can also begin according to plan. But it remains absolutely uncertain whether the French army will meet us [on the left, on the right, or on both banks of the Mosel] and where, or if, it will wait for our attack. It is nevertheless important to pass through the narrow area between Brussels and Namur north of the Meuse before an encounter with the enemy, so that the nine army corps can achieve their effect without disruption. This is why it is crucial to accelerate the advance of the Germans’ right flank wherever possible. Since the army will wheel to the left, the advance of its other units will increasingly slow down on the left.

The German armies advancing on the right bank of the Meuse must be prepared to encounter the enemy at any time on this side of the river. They must at all times be capable of forming a front that is sufficient to at least repel the enemy, even if he is superior. This will be made more difficult by the Longwy and Montmédy fortresses, which, if possible, must be captured or at least neutralized. It will also be difficult due to the forested mountains that cut through the region south of the Semois and by the extensive forested areas north of the river. Constant vigilance and a proper assignment of marching routes is necessary on the part of the army commanders. This will be all the easier to achieve because the daily marches need not be very long. The troops will be able to perform their tasks only if they are trained to maneuver and fight in forested areas and mountains.

Once the Germans penetrate the chain of French fortifications left of the Meuse – be it after a triumphant battle on Belgian territory, a successful attack on the fortified line, or after encountering no strong resistance at all – they will turn on the left flank of the French line near Mézières, Rethel, and La Fère, according to plan. [The forward Mézières-Verdun line on the Meuse will probably be evacuated quickly, but the French will not remain inactive in the positions on the Aisne and those between Reims and La Fère, simply waiting for an attack on their left flank. They will either find themselves a new line or launch a counterattack. The latter would be more desirable for us. Provided that the two corps can be brought up from the right bank of the Mosel, the Germans will unite their forces to the extent that this is possible under existing conditions. They will march as a single army. Their left wing will be as protected as possible, their right wing is strong. It is improbable that the French, who must first consolidate their corps, will be able to organize their entire army as effectively. The enemy’s circumvention maneuver through Belgium will force them to take precipitous steps and make errors when assigning detachments. Once the Germans defeat the Belgian and French fortifications on the northern border and overcome the inhospitable terrain of the Ardennes, they must be seen as having the more favorable position. Yet it will be less favorable if the French await their opponents’ attack in a fortified position or behind the course of a river.

It is conceivable that an army beaten in the south of Belgium or the north of France will stop to put up renewed resistance behind the Somme, which is linked by canal to the Oise near La Fère. This would result in the German right wing advancing on Amiens or even on Abbeville.

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